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This paper introduces a new methodology for the estimation of demand trade elasticities based on
an import intensity-adjusted measure of aggregate demand, with the foundation of a stylized theoretical
model. We compute the import intensity of demand components by using the OECD Input-Output
tables. We argue that the composition of demand plays a key role in trade dynamics because of the
large movements in the most import-intensive categories of expenditure (especially investment, but
also exports). We provide evidence in favor of these mechanisms for a panel of 18 OECD countries,
paying particular attention to the 2008-09 Great Trade Collapse.
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The relation between trade ﬂows and aggregate macroeconomic dynamics is a central question in
international economics at least since Houthakker and Magee’s (1969) seminal work on the estimation
of income and price elasticities of trade. The issue has received renewed attention, and the debate on
the determinants of trade ﬂows has re-heated, as scholars debated the adjustment of the global trade
imbalances that emerged in the 2000s and struggled to understand the dynamics of world trade in
the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-09. One of the key features of the global recession
triggered by this crisis was a sharp contraction in world trade that reached its peak between the end
of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. In 2009, global trade fell by 11% in real terms on a year-on-year
basis—an unprecedented development since 1945. A distinct feature of this Great Trade Collapse
(GTC; Baldwin, 2009) is that the fall in world trade has been much more pronounced than the fall
in world output (real world GDP dropped by 0.7% in 2009). The change in global trade was higher
than that of global output by a factor of 16 in 2009, against an average of 1.9 in the 1990-2008 period
(Figure 1). The fall in international trade aﬀected a large number of countries in all main economic
regions, albeit to a diﬀerent extent (Figure 2).
In this paper we re-examine the relation between trade ﬂows and macroeconomic dynamics by
developing a new methodology for the estimation of trade elasticities—speciﬁcally, the elasticity
of import demand to aggregate demand—that takes into account the diﬀerent import content and
cyclical behavior of the diﬀerent components of aggregate demand. We use the OECD Input-Output
tables to show that the most procyclical components of demand (investment and exports) have a
particularly rich import content, whereas the other components (private consumption and, especially,
government spending) have lower import content. As a result, the fall in imports during recessions
typically exceeds that of GDP by a considerable magnitude, due to the sharp reduction in the
components of GDP that have the highest import content. The fall in investment is often larger
than that of GDP, which triggers a sharp contraction in imports (investment being a particularly
import-intensive category of expenditure). By contrast, government spending and, to a lesser extent,
private consumption are not aﬀected as much, but this does not dampen the fall in imports due to the
relatively lower import content of these categories of expenditure.1 This mechanism was especially
strong during the 2008-09 GTC, during which the fall in imports was ten times larger than the fall
in GDP.2
Armed with these observations and intuition, we construct a new measure of aggregate demand,
which we call IAD (for Import-intensity-Adjusted Demand) as a weighted average of traditional
1Note that, even if investment and exports are unconditionally more volatile than GDP, and consumption is
smoother, a closer look at the data shows that the most procyclical components of aggregate demand fall more sharply
during recessions than they rise in expansions as we review in our empirical work.
2In the United States, for instance, the annualized fall in total investment in the last quarter of 2008 and in the
ﬁrst quarter of 2009 was about 24% and 31%, respectively, whereas GDP—partly supported by government spending—
contracted by “only” 9.2% and 6.8%.
1aggregate demand components (investment, private consumption, government spending, and exports)
using as weights the import contents of demand computed from the OECD Input-Output tables. We
show that IAD is highly correlated with GDP, but more volatile on average (especially during
recessions). We provide a theoretical foundation for IAD as the appropriate measure of aggregate
demand in empirical trade equations by relying on a translog GDP function, following Feenstra
(2003a, Chapter 3), Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008), and a series of articles by Kohli (1978; 1990a,b;
1993). We show that this approach yields a parsimonious, estimable import demand equation in
which imports depend on aggregate demand and relative import prices in the same fashion as implied
by the traditional C.E.S. demand system, but for two important diﬀerences: First, IAD replaces the
C.E.S. aggregate demand co mposite as the appropriate measure of aggregate demand. Second, the
elasticity of import demand to (the correct measure of) aggregate demand is no longer restricted to
one.
We take this new empirical model to the data using a panel of 18 OECD countries over the
period 1985Q1-2010Q2 (the choice of countries reﬂects data availability: The empirical exercise
requires suﬃciently long time series to be able to capture a suﬃcient number of business cycles). We
ﬁnd that IAD is superior to the standard, alternative measures of aggregate demand used in the
literature in terms of both goodness of ﬁt and, importantly, stability of parameter estimates. The
IAD-based model performs remarkably well in explaining the GTC compared to the alternatives:
Our basic speciﬁcation explains 85% of the average fall in imports in the G7 countries in 2009Q1
against 51% when using GDP as explanatory variable. The regression using IAD explains 93% of
the fall in imports when the additional demand component “change in inventories” is added to the
regression. Most importantly, the empirical model outperforms the alternatives over the entire sample
period, not just during the recent crisis, yielding estimated elasticities of imports to (the appropriate
measure of) aggregate demand that are signiﬁcantly less volatile across the diﬀerent phases of the
cycle.
According to the model, there is no major “puzzle” in the magnitude of the fall in world trade
observed during the recent ﬁnancial crisis: Trade fell mostly because demand crashed globally and
did so particularly in its most import-intensive component—investment. Moreover, the strong re-
lationship between exports and imports in each country (in 2005, the average import content of
exports was 28% for the sample of countries, and 23% for the G7), linked to the increased interna-
tionalization of production and the strong dependence of the tradable sector on imported inputs,
contributed to the simultaneity and unprecedented severity of the trade collapse. Our approach and
results conﬁrm Marquez’s (1999) argument that using standard measures of aggregate demand, such
as GDP or domestic demand, in trade equations may be misleading, and more so in periods in which
the more import-intensive components of aggregate demand (i.e., investment and exports) ﬂuctuate
2much more than the others, such as the 2008-09 crisis.3
Finally, the theoretical and empirical implications of the model go some way toward explaining
the so-called Houthakker-Magee puzzle. This puzzle arises when regressing real imports on measures
of aggregate demand and relative import prices yields a coeﬃcient for the demand variable that is
signiﬁcantly larger than one (a result ﬁrst found by Houthakker and Magee, 1969, and subsequently
conﬁrmed in a large number of studies). This result is traditionally viewed as a puzzle because a
coeﬃcient above one implies that the ratio of imports to GDP should be above 100% in the long
run. While this may be realistic for small open economies, it is clearly at odds with stylized facts
for the United States and other large advanced economies.4 There is, however, another reason for
the standard empirical ﬁnding to be viewed as puzzling, and it is that it violates a key restriction of
the C.E.S. model—which is the usual theoretical underpinning of empirical investigation—that the
coeﬃcient of the demand variable should be one.
We propose a simple explanation for the puzzle, based on the cyclical behavior of aggregate
demand components during recessions and their import content. Indeed, when the usual regression
of imports on GDP is performed on a sample excluding recessions, we ﬁnd that the Houthakker-
Magee puzzle almost disappears: The coeﬃcient of GDP is close to one. By contrast, this coeﬃcient
is usually between 2 and 3 when the sample is restricted to recessions (which violates the C.E.S.
restriction). The reason why the apparent elasticity of imports to demand increases during recessions
is related to the behavior of aggregate demand components during these episodes and their diﬀerent
import contents. By adjusting for import content in the construction of IAD and departing from
the C.E.S. benchmark, we ﬁnd a much more stable estimated elasticity over the entire sample.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, paying
particular attention to the ability of standard empirical models to account for the recent fall in world
trade. Section 3 provides stylized facts on the import content of investment, exports, and private
and government consumption, and presents the new intensity-weighted measure of demand based
on the OECD Input-Output tables. Section 4 provides a theoretical foundation for the regression
equation with the new measure of demand as the correct measure of aggregate demand. Section 5
turns to empirical evidence for a panel of 18 OECD countries. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper relates both to the recent literature on the 2008-2009 Great Trade Collapse and to the
longer-standing question of how to estimate trade elasticities. Starting with the former, numerous
3Marquez (1999) questioned the usefulness of the log-linear model of trade since the elasticities of trade to income
varied as trade openness modiﬁed the domestic/foreign composition of expenditure. In our model, the elasticity of im-
ports to aggregate demand is stable because our adjusted demand measure fully reﬂects these composition adjustments
by including time-varying import intensities and distribution of expenditure across diﬀerent categories.
4Interestingly, Houthakker and Magee (1969) found that the results are not symmetric for exports and imports:
The coeﬃcient of the aggregate demand variable is much larger for imports than exports. In this paper, we focus only
on imports, for which the puzzle arises most strongly.
3studies have attempted to shed light on the GTC (see Baldwin, 2009, for an early assessment and
review).
The role of trade credit attracted immediate attention, given the ﬁnancial origin of the 2008-
2009 crisis. Analyzing the case of Japan, Amiti, and Weinstein (2011) show that exporters rely on
ﬁnance more than ﬁrms that sell only domestically in order to reduce the risks that are typical of
international transactions (longer payment lags, higher counterparty risks, etc.), thus making the
trade sector more sensitive to changes in ﬁnancing conditions; Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein (2011)
conﬁrm this result by looking at the dynamics of export prices in those sectors where ﬁnancial
frictions are more signiﬁcant. Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2011) incorporate the conclusions of Amiti and
Weinstein (2011) in a model of heterogeneous ﬁrms and banks with incomplete information on the
ﬁrms, and test the implications of the model against the dynamics of China’s manufacturing ﬁrms
over the period 2000-2008, conﬁrming that exporting ﬁrms faced more severe ﬁnancing constraints
than domestic ones. Chor and Manova (2011) document that credit conditions had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on exports to the United States. Our analysis is not inconsistent with this evidence: While
abstracting from an explicit analysis of trade credit, our results show that the demand components
that are expected to be most sensitive to ﬁnancing conditions (e.g., investment) experience the largest
drop during times of crisis and are the main driver of import dynamics.
Using disaggregated data on U.S. imports and exports, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010)
proposed an alternative explanation, arguing that the fall in U.S. imports cannot be explained with
a simple import demand model. They ﬁnd that sectors used as intermediate inputs were characterized
by higher decreases in both imports and exports. Our analysis complements this result, to the extent
that investment is particularly rich in intermediate goods. The same authors further explored and
rejected the hypothesis that U.S. imports of high-quality goods experienced larger falls than low-
quality goods (Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar, 2011).
Our work is also closely related to Bems, Johnson, and Yi (2010) and Eaton, Kortum, Neiman,
and Romalis (2011). Bems et al. (2010) combine the synthetic global Input-Output table constructed
by Johnson and Noguera (2009) with a Leontief production function to study the contribution of
changes in the composition of demand and country speciﬁc demand shocks in the global trade contrac-
tion. They also show that, in line with our conclusions and in contrast with those of B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e,
Decreux, Fontagn´ e, and Khoudour-Cast´ eras (2009), international fragmentation of the production
process can actually amplify the impact of demand shocks and justify elasticities to production larger
than one in presence of asymmetric shocks across countries and sectors. Our work diﬀers from theirs
in several dimensions. First, the baseline decomposition of domestic GDP is based on expenditure
components (private consumption, government consumption, investment, and exports) instead of
commodity groupings (durables, non-durables, and services). Second, in our framework, changes in
each individual component of spending aﬀect imports according to their import intensity (i.e., the
4share of spending falling on imported goods), while, in Bems et al. (2010), the relation between
spending components and imports is mostly driven by the share of imports linked to that type of
spending in total imports. To better understand this diﬀerence, consider the case of changes in
investment spending. In our framework, a change in investment spending translates into a change in
the aggregate demand measure that matters for import demand according to the share of investment
spending that goes (directly or indirectly) to imported goods. By contrast, in Bems et al. (2010),
the relation between spending and import demand is mostly driven by the share of investment goods
in total imports. Because of the level of detail of their Input-Output framework, the extension of
their analysis to the time series dimension is practically very diﬃcult. Our framework, on the op-
posite, is suitable for time series analysis and can be replicated easily for all the countries for which
expenditure-based Input-Output tables exist.
Eaton et al. (2011) develop a Ricardian model of trade, where the Input-Output tables are used
to evaluate value added and derive the component of expenditure falling on intermediate goods.
Through the use of counterfactuals, they conclude that the demand composition shock is by far
the most important driver of the global trade contraction; trade frictions play a much more limited
role and are relevant only in China and Japan. Our work complements their study by integrating
compositional shifts in the new demand measure.
The composition of domestic demand and its impact on external trade has also been the focus of
work in the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium literature. Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006)
use the SIGMA model developed at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to show
that the composition of demand in the U.S. matters for the response of trade to a variety of shocks
(they explore in particular the eﬀect of an investment shock). The main diﬀerence with our analysis
is that they are primarily concerned with the impact of various shocks on investment in the context
of global imbalances and their adjustment. Our study, by contrast, aims at studying the impact of
composition eﬀects and quantifying their importance across countries. In addition, Erceg, Guerrieri,
and Gust (2006) focus on the composition of domestic demand only, ignoring the role of the import
content of exports.
Our study is also related to the literature on the well-known Houthakker-Magee puzzle, according
to which the elasticity of imports to aggregate demand (measured by total income) is too high in
many countries and implies an ever growing ratio of imports to GDP. From a theoretical point of
view, this result is puzzling, as the traditional C.E.S. demand system or production function implies
that the elasticity of imports to aggregate demand should not be diﬀerent than one. The puzzle can
be seen also from another point of view. With the elasticity of exports to income usually estimated
to be lower than the corresponding import elasticity, a worldwide increase in income would translate
into a global trade deﬁcit, clearly in contradiction with the need to ensure globally balanced trade.
Several attempts have been made to explain the puzzle by using diﬀerent measures of aggregate
5demand or price indices, or by including additional independent variables. These studies have often
estimated diﬀerent individual income elasticities for imports, but always well above one (see Marquez,
2002, for a discussion). In this paper, we address the puzzle from two diﬀerent angles. On one hand,
we address the problem from a theoretical point of view, showing how a translog speciﬁcation of
the GDP function (or of import demand itself) is consistent with an aggregate demand elasticity
of imports that is diﬀerent than one. On the other hand, we still aim at generating an empirical
elasticity that is not too far from one in our estimation exercise to avoid the problem of ever increasing
trade deﬁcit in presence of income and demand growth. Our import intensity-adjusted measure of
demand, indeed, generates elasticities that are considerably smaller and more stable than standard
aggregate demand measures.
The focus on the composition of trade for the Houthakker-Magee puzzle also relates our work to
Mann and Pl¨ uck (2005). Their study, which aims to improve the estimates of U.S. trade elasticities,
uses disaggregated data, matching commodity categories of imports with the corresponding domestic
expenditure. They also study the impact of changes in the country composition of trade and add
an independent variable to their regressions to take into account the impact of increased variety, as
suggested by Feenstra (1994). Their econometric model can explain export dynamics better than the
standard model, but it performs worse on imports. Focusing, as we do, only on import dynamics,
Leibovici and Waugh (2011) show that an aggregate demand elasticity above one (together with other
statistical features of imports and output behavior) can be obtained by considering a trade model
with time-to-ship frictions and ﬁnite intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Our speciﬁcation also
allows for aggregate demand elasticity above one, but without relying on any particular assumption
on the timing of payments and shipping.
Finally, the use of Input-Output tables in international trade analysis has antecedents to our
work and that cited above. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) relied on Input-Output tables to measure
and analyze the nature of vertical specialization, while Johnson and Noguera (2011) combined Input-
Output tables with bilateral trade data to measure how production is shared across countries and
types of goods, showing that international trade ﬂows in value added terms are very diﬀerent from
those in gross production terms.5
3 A New Measure of Aggregate Demand
This section describes the information contained in the OECD Input-Output (henceforth, I-O)
database and the methodology to construct the import contents of ﬁnal demand expenditures. It
also introduces our new measure of aggregate demand, IAD, or import intensity-adjusted aggregate
5The use of input-output tables for the estimation of trade elasticities and the forecasting of imports actually dates
back to Sundararajan and Thakur (1976), who applied it to Korean data. Diﬀerently from our paper, they focused
only on short-term import dynamics and did not generate a synthetic adjusted demand measure.
6demand.6
3.1 The OECD Input-Output Database and the Import Content of Expenditure
Components
The I-O tables describe the sale and purchase relations between producers and consumers within an
economy. The I-O database is thus used as fundamental statistics to estimate industrial ﬁgures in
national accounts.7 The growing importance of globalization has increased demand for the informa-
tion oﬀered by the Input-Output system. Examples of I-O-based globalization indicators include:
the import penetration ratio of intermediate and ﬁnal goods, the import content of exports (an in-
dicator of vertical specialization), and the unit value added induced by exports. While there is a
literature on the import content of exports (e.g., see Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001; De Backer and
Yamano, 2007; and OECD, 2011), to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to compute and compare
the import content by expenditure components across countries.
The most recent version of the OECD I-O database includes tables for all OECD countries
and several non-member countries for the years 1995, 2000, and 2005, and/or the nearest years.
Comparisons across countries are made possible through the use of a standard industry list based on
ISIC Revision 3. The database covers 88% of 2005 world GDP and 64% of 2005 world population.
The maximum available number of sectors is 48.8 Imported intermediates and domestically provided
inputs are explicitly separated.
Figure 3 provides a stylized illustration of the information in the OECD I-O database. For each
country, there are three main matrices, one including total inter-industy ﬂows of transactions of
goods and services (domestically provided and imported) and two detailing separately domestically
provided and imported ﬂows.9 Each matrix is then divided in two main parts: The ﬁrst part (in blue
in the ﬁgure) describes the ﬂows of intermediate inputs used in domestic production, the second part
(in green) contains instead information on ﬁnal demand expenditure.
The cells in the Zd section of the “domestic” matrix contain the amount of domestically pro-
duced inputs from sector i (row) needed by sector j (column) for production throughout the year of
reference, while the cells in the Zm section of the “import” matrix contain the amount of imported
inputs from sector i (row) needed by sector j (column). In the calculations below, we will use slightly
modiﬁed input matrices, Ad and Am, where the domestic input coeﬃcients ad
i;j contain the amount
of domestically produced inputs from sector i needed to produce one unit of output in sector j,
and the imported input coeﬃcients am
i;j contain the imported inputs from sector i needed to produce
6A more detailed explanation of the OECD I-O database and the methodology to compute import contents is in
Yamano and Ahmad (2006), De Backer and Yamano (2007), and Guo, Webb, and Yamano (2009).
7This database, with its internationally harmonized tables, is a useful empirical tool for economic analysis of
structural change when used in conjunction with other international databases on industrial structures, e.g., bilateral
trade, labor and environmental impact statistics, etc.
8Two in Mining 2, 22 in Manufacturing, 23 in Services, and Agriculture.
9In this section we use the terms industry and sector interchangeably.
7one unit of output in sector j.10 In the other part of the matrices (in green), Fd reports the ﬁnal
demand of domestically produced goods and services (each column refers to a diﬀerent expenditure
component, such as household consumption, government consumption, exports, gross ﬁxed capital
formation, change in inventories, etc.), while Fm reports the direct imports of goods and services by
ﬁnal expenditure component.
We use both the “domestic” and “import” matrices to construct the import contents of four
expenditure components: private consumption, government consumption, investment (proxied by
gross ﬁxed capital formation), and exports.11 Notice that we aggregate information across sectors
and look at the import contents only at a macroeconomic (or country) level. In particular, the
matrices allow us to compute, for each expenditure component k, the value of indirect imports
Mind
k , i.e., the amount of imports “induced” by the expenditure on domestically provided goods and
services.12 These include imports of intermediate inputs from foreign suppliers, as well as imports
that are already incorporated in capital and intermediate inputs acquired from domestic suppliers.
The “import” matrix, instead, allows us to compute the value of direct imports, Mdir
k , for each
expenditure component k.
Let us assume that there are S sectors and K ﬁnal demand components in the economy, and that
domestic output from each sector is used both as an intermediate input by the other sectors and to
satisfy ﬁnal demand. The domestic output from sector i needed to satisfy the ﬁnal demand from the







In matrix format this becomes:
X = AdX + Fd,
where X is the S  K matrix of domestic output induced by each spending component k, Ad is the
SS matrix of domestic input coeﬃcients, and Fd is the SK matrix of ﬁnal demands of domestic






10These coeﬃcients can be easily derived by dividing the value of each cell in Z
d and Z
m by the sum of the respective
column (total output of sector j).
11The highly volatile nature of changes in inventories prevented us from including them in our analysis, mainly
because of the impossibility to construct stable and meaningful import contents for such component of total expenditure.
Moreover, changes in inventories represent on average a very small part of GDP (in the United States, for instance, they
accounted for 0.3% of GDP on average in the last twenty years). We recognize, however, that changes in inventories may
play a bigger role in some phases of the business cycle, in particular during recession episodes, and that their behavior
may explain part of the fall in imports registered during the 2008-09 crisis (see, for instance, Alessandria, Kaboski,
and Midrigan, 2010). To explore this hypothesis, in the empirical section we perform regressions where changes in
inventories are added as a control variable to the basic speciﬁcations, and we ﬁnd that their inclusion improves our
results but is not central to them.
12Indirect imports are often associated with vertical specialization.
8where
(
I   Ad) 1is commonly referred to as the Leontief inverse.
The imports of intermediate inputs from sector i induced by the expenditure on domestically















where Mind is the SK matrix of indirect imports induced by each spending component k, and Am
is the S  S matrix of imported input coeﬃcients.
Direct imports are given instead directly by the following S  K matrix:
Mdir = Fm.
Total imports can then be expressed as the sum of direct and indirect imports, that is:






















where u is a 1S vector with all elements equal to 1 and the subscript k selects the k-th column of
each matrix, corresponding to the expenditure component of interest.
In addition to the total import content ωk, it is also possible to derive a direct and indirect import

















where the indirect import content tells us the share of intermediate imported inputs per unit of
ﬁnal demand, and the direct import content tells us the share of imported ﬁnal goods and services.
Notice that the direct import content of exports is equal to zero as re-exports of goods and services
are excluded from the analysis.13 Table 1 shows the evolution of import contents (total, direct, and
13We are aware that the amount of processing trade is relatively large for some countries, such as China and other
emerging economies, so that our numbers for the import content of exports are biased downward in these cases. In this
paper, however, we have chosen not to consider re-exports in line with other OECD publications (see, among others,
9indirect) of the main GDP expenditure components over time for a large set of countries.14
3.2 Import Intensity-Adjusted Aggregate Demand
Empirical trade models typically use measures of aggregate demand, such as GDP or domestic
demand, ignoring the fact that diﬀerent components of expenditure have diﬀerent import contents.
Figure 4 shows the import contents of private and government consumption, investment, and exports
for our panel of 18 countries based on the 2005 I-O tables, together with the average across all
countries and the G7.15
As Figure 4 shows, the import content of government consumption is low across all countries
(government spending mostly includes non-tradables, such as services, and a high share of domes-
tically produced goods, e.g., for the defense industry). Turning to the other two main components
of domestic expenditure, investment has a higher import content than private consumption in all
countries but the UK. Finally, exports are also very import-intensive as shown by the purple bars in
the ﬁgure: On average the import content of exports is 28%, with peaks of about 40% for small open
economies such as Belgium or Portugal and some emerging countries (see Table 1 for a comparison
across a larger set of countries). The country order of import content shares is mainly determined
by two factors: availability of intermediate suppliers (country size) and position in the global pro-
duction network. Japan and the United States, for instance, have relatively more domestic suppliers
for their production network than most European countries, which rely on more foreign products for
their production. This explains why the import contents of Japanese and U.S. exports are rather
low (although, in the case of Japan, rising over time).
Consistent with these ﬁndings, imports tend to be strongly correlated on average with exports
and investment and, to a lesser extent, private consumption, while they appear to be uncorrelated
with government consumption, as shown in Figure 5.
In this paper, we focus on imports, and we propose a new measure of aggregate demand that
reﬂects the import intensity of the diﬀerent components of domestic expenditure and the import
content of exports. We call this import intensity-adjusted measure of demand IAD, for “import-










where C stands for private consumption, G for government consumption, I for investment, and X
for exports, included to take the import content of export demand into account. In logarithms:
OECD, 2011, pp. 178-179). Moreover, in our empirical analysis we focus mainly on advanced OECD economies for
which the amount of re-exports is smaller, so that our results should not be signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
14We report the values for 1995, 2000, and 2005 in Table 1. For some countries, 1985 and 1990 values exist and are
available upon request.
15The countries we focus on are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the U.S.
10lnIADt = ωC;t lnCt + ωG;t lnGt + ωI;t lnIt + ωX;t lnXt.
The weights, ωk;t, k = C,G,I,X, are the total import contents of ﬁnal demand expenditures and
are constructed as explained in Section 3.1. They are time varying and normalized in each period
such that their sum is equal to one.16
We shall show that IAD represents a better measure of aggregate demand than domestic demand
or GDP to explain import ﬂuctuations since it weighs each GDP component according to its import
content. Two facts are also worth noting: First, the relative import contents of the main compo-
nents of GDP are substantially diﬀerent from their shares in GDP (on average, private consumption
represents 60% of GDP in our panel of countries, against 20% of government consumption and invest-
ment17). Second, diﬀerent components of aggregate demand showed very diﬀerent behaviors during
the crisis. Indeed, investment and exports fell much more than private and government consumption
in most countries. The fact that investment falls more sharply than other categories of expenditure
during recessions is a robust stylized fact.18 Thus, the fact that standard GDP computations ne-
glect that investment and exports tend to have larger import content than private consumption and
government consumption may explain why the fall in trade during the 2008-09 crisis was larger than
suggested by estimated elasticities based on GDP as the measure of demand.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for quarterly changes in IAD, GDP and imports, M,
for the full set of 18 countries and for the G7 over the entire sample period and also distinguishing
between recessions (deﬁned as two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth) and expansions.
The table shows that IAD is highly correlated with GDP—the average correlation coeﬃcient over
the entire sample being 0.66 for the full set of countries and 0.77 for the G7—and also strongly
correlated with imports—the coeﬃcient being 0.62 and 0.70, respectively—, while the correlation
between GDP and imports is much lower, especially during expansions. Moreover, both ﬁrst and
second moments of IAD are closer to those of imports than the moments of GDP: In particular,
IAD, is signiﬁcantly more volatile than GDP during recessions—when its average standard deviation
is twice that of GDP—but also during expansionary phases.
Figure 6 looks explicitly at the behavior of GDP, its components, and IAD during the two years
after the start of a recession (deﬁned as before) for our panel of 18 OECD countries and the G7.19
16Since the I-O tables allow us to compute import contents for the diﬀerent demand components only every ﬁve
years, we linearly interpolate the available points to construct quarterly weights. For the period after 2005, we assume
the same weight as in 2005. For some countries, the I-O tables do not provide data before 1995. In these cases, we use
the same weight as in 1995 for the period before.
17Exports and imports also represent on average 20% of GDP.
18It is consistent with the standard property of the business cycle for many countries that investment is more volatile
than GDP, while consumption is smoother.
19To obtain the lines in Figure 6, we performed panel regressions for each of the variables, where the regressors are
an indicator of recession start (equal to 1 in the ﬁrst quarter of a recession), the lags of such indicator, and country-
speciﬁc dummy variables. The methodology is similar to that of IMF (2010). The resulting line for each variable can
be interpreted as its unconditional average cumulative fall during recession periods.
11Panels A and C show the average fall in each variable during all the recessions that occurred between
1985 and 2007, whereas panels B and D refer to the 2008-09 recession only. The ﬁgures also include
the behavior of GDP and the new measure of demand, IAD. As panel A shows, investment is the
demand component that exhibits the largest fall during recessions, dropping by 16% on average
two years after the start of a recession. Trade variables also fall substantially in the ﬁrst year and
then gradually recover. Government consumption does not generally fall during recessions (possibly
because it is used for counter-cyclical policy), while private consumption falls less than GDP on
average. Our adjusted measure of demand falls by 8.3% on average after two years, 2.5 percentage
points more than GDP, and its dynamics follow quite closely those of imports during recessions.
Focusing on the 2008-09 recession, the ﬁrst major diﬀerence is the scale of the vertical axis, which
is almost doubled: Investment fell by more than 20% on average and did not exhibit any sign of
recovery after two years. The second major diﬀerence is the size of the average fall of trade, which in
the case of imports is more than twice the size observed during previous recessions and in the case of
exports is higher by a factor of ﬁve. This last feature illustrates clearly the global nature of the 2008-
09 recession: Exports on average fell modestly during previous recessions, partly because external
demand was sustained by trading partners in a diﬀerent phase of the cycle. In contrast, during
2008-09, 17 out of the 18 countries experienced a recession (the only exception being Australia),
driving down external demand for each country in the sample. This global eﬀect, together with the
propagation/synchronization mechanism implied by increased vertical integration, helps explain why
the fall in trade in 2008-09 was exceptionally large and synchronized. Finally, panel B shows that
IAD exhibits a drop of about 15% two years after the start of the crisis, reﬂecting signiﬁcant export
and investment losses, against a realized drop in GDP of “only” 7.5%. The story is rather similar
in terms of behavior of diﬀerent components of demand and diﬀerences in magnitude between past
recessions and the 2008-09 one when looking at the G7 countries.
Having constructed the new aggregate demand measure and taken an initial look at its empirical
properties, we next provide a theoretical foundation for its role in the determination of import
demand and its inclusion in trade regressions of the form commonly featured in the literature.
4 IAD Theory
The traditional theoretical underpinning of much empirical trade literature is the C.E.S. demand
system. Under C.E.S. preferences, (log) import demand is determined by
lnMt = lnDt + βP lnPM;t, (2)
where Dt is aggregate demand (a C.E.S. aggregator of domestic and imported goods) and PM;t is
the relative import price. In the standard framework, the basket Mt is itself a C.E.S. aggregate of
individual imports. Equation (2) restricts the elasticity of imports to aggregate demand to be equal
12to one, while βP can take any negative value (estimates based on aggregate macro data typically put
its absolute value at or near 1.5—although Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc, 2008, argue in favor of a
value between zero and one—while estimates based on more disaggregated data usually ﬁnd higher
absolute values). The C.E.S. demand equation (2) is the foundation of regressions of the form:
∆lnMt = δ + βD∆lnDt + βP∆lnPM;t + εt, (3)
where ∆ denotes ﬁrst diﬀerence (on account of non-stationarity), δ is a constant, and εt is the error
term. The Houthakker-Magee puzzle is the ﬁnding of Houthakker and Magee (1969) and many
subsequent studies that the estimated elasticity of imports to aggregate demand, ˆ βD, is signiﬁcantly
above one.
Our goal in this section is to provide a theoretical foundation for a (log) import demand equa-
tion that is consistent with the regression equation (3), does not restrict the elasticity of imports to
aggregate demand to be one, and in which aggregate demand takes the form of the IAD aggregator—
in levels, a Cobb-Douglas function with time-varying weights—of private consumption, government
consumption, investment, and exports. The goal of obtaining an unrestricted theoretical elastic-
ity of imports to aggregate demand raises the question whether such unrestricted elasticity would
automatically imply that the Houthakker-Magee puzzle is no longer a puzzle. We argue that this
conclusion would not be correct. The fact that the C.E.S. demand system restricts the coeﬃcient
of aggregate demand to one implies that any estimate that is statistically diﬀerent from one is a
puzzle—even estimates below one—if one takes the C.E.S. system literally. The particular mani-
festation of the puzzle known as the Houthakker-Magee puzzle is that the estimate is signiﬁcantly
larger than one, which (in conjunction with a smaller estimate for the elasticity of exports) raises the
issue of sustainability of a country’s external position. A demand system that does not restrict the
coeﬃcient of aggregate demand in the import equation to one does not in itself imply resolution of
the economic puzzle that a coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly above one can derail sustainability. The model we
propose in this section implies that estimates below and above one are not necessarily puzzling from
the perspective of consistency with the theoretical demand system (thus allowing for meaningful
degrees of freedom in what one expects the estimation procedure to deliver relative to the theory).
But it is still the case that the estimated elasticity of imports to aggregate demand ought to be close
to one (or below, or not much above) to avoid puzzling implications for sustainability.
The theoretical foundation for the regression equation with IAD as the correct measure of ag-
gregate demand and an unrestricted elasticity is a production possibilities frontier with imports
understood to be inputs in total output determination and aggregated into a single variable. The
construct follows Feenstra (2003a, Chapter 3) and a series of articles by Kohli (1978; 1990a,b; 1993),
but we think of output as demand-driven on the way to thinking of imports as demand-driven.20
20We are grateful to James Anderson for suggestions that led to the development of this foundation.
13The total output (or GDP) function in Feenstra (2003a, Ch. 3) is usually written as a function
of prices. Omitting time indexes to save on notation, let Y be the vector of outputs, P be the price
vector of these outputs, M be imports, PM be the price vector of imports, and F be the vector
of primary factors of production.21 Given a convex technology T (function of Y , M, and F), the
eﬃcient economy is assumed to determine outputs of individual goods and imports to maximize total
output (GDP) subject to prices and the endowments of primary factors. Let GDP be described by
the function v() of P, PM, and F deﬁned as:
v(P,PM,F)  max
Y;M
PY   PMM j Y 2 T(Y,M,F).
In this setup, the demand for imports is given by the partial derivative  vPM(P,PM,F), while the
supply of output is given by vP(P,PM,F).
To think now of imports as demand-driven, we need to use the market clearing condition for out-
put, vP(P,PM,F) = D, where D is the demand vector. Deﬁne the new GDP function V (D,PM,F)
as function of the demand vector D, import prices PM, and primary factors F as follows. Let
˜ v(D,PM,F)  min
P
v(P,PM,F)   PD.
The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is the market clearing condition for output, which can be
solved for the market clearing price. Then we can write the GDP function as
V (D,PM,F)  ˜ v(D,PM,F) + D˜ vD(D,PM,F). (4)
Import demand is therefore given by the partial derivative
M(D,PM,F) =  VPM(D,PM,F). (5)
Given this result, we can obtain the desired import demand equation in two ways: One relies on
assuming that the GDP function is approximated by a translog function, in the spirit of Kohli (1978;
1990a,b; 1993) and Feenstra (2003a, Ch. 3).22 The alternative consists of imposing the translog
assumption directly on the import demand function in (5). We show the result for each of these
approaches below.23
21All prices are in real terms.
22See also Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008), who focus on the estimation of import demand elasticities to prices,
and Harrigan (1997).
23The translog function has been shown to have appealing empirical properties in a variety of contexts in addition
to the work reviewed in Feenstra (2003a, Ch. 3). For instance, Bergin and Feenstra (2000, 2001) show that a
translog expenditure function makes it possible to generate empirically plausible endogenous persistence in macro and
international macro models by virtue of the implied demand-side pricing complementarities. Feenstra (2003b) shows
that the properties of the translog expenditure function used by Bergin and Feenstra (2000, 2001) hold also when the
number of goods varies. Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007) ﬁnd that translog preferences and endogenous producer
entry result in markup dynamics that are remarkably close to U.S. data. Rodr´ ıguez-L´ opez (2011) extends the model
of trade and macro dynamics with heterogeneous ﬁrms in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) to include nominal rigidity and a
translog expenditure function. He obtains plausible properties for exchange rate pass-through, markup dynamics, and
cyclical responses of ﬁrm-level and aggregate variables to shocks.
144.1 Translog GDP Function
Suppose that the GDP function V (D,PM,F) is described by the following translog function:24
lnV (D,PM,F) = α +
∑
k





























ϕkf lnDk lnFf + lnPM
∑
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The translog function (6) implies that the share of imports M in GDP, sV
M, is linear in the (log)


















Second-order terms in the translog GDP function are crucial for the import share to deviate from
the Cobb-Douglas share µP. Note that, since imports are an input to GDP, the import share sV
M is
negative. In (7), we used the short-hand notation  M  VPM(D,PM,F) and V  V (D,PM,F).
Consider now the absolute value of the import share: PMM/V . Diﬀerentiating this expression
and deﬁning percent deviations from steady state, we have:
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where, for any variable Q, ˆ Q  dQ/ ¯ Q, d denotes the diﬀerentiation operator, and overbars denote
levels along the steady-state path. Note that, for small enough perturbations, ˆ Q  dQ/ ¯ Q  dlnQ =
lnQ   ln ¯ Q. It follows that:
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where the second approximate equality follows from diﬀerentiating the expression of the import share
in (7) after changing sign. Rearranging this equation yields:
dlnM  (dlnV   dlnPM)  
1    ¯ sV
M











24See Feenstra (2003, Ch.3) for the parameter restrictions that are usually imposed on the translog GDP function
(as function only of prices and factor endowments) to ensure homogeneity of degree 1 and symmetry. Some restrictions
would be diﬀerent for our transformed function. However, we do not rely on any of these restrictions below, so they
can be safely ignored for our purposes.
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For simplicity, assume that all the second order terms in (6) are constant at their steady-state levels
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Introduce time indexes, allow for time variation in the coeﬃcients on aggregate demand compo-
nents, and deﬁne:
βk;t  µk;t  
1    ¯ sV
M
   ϕk;t,












where we impose the restrictions βk;t > 0 and βP < 0. Note that the ﬁrst deﬁnition implicitly

















Assume that the eﬀect of growth in the deviations of factor endowments from the steady-state
16path is also negligible:
∑

















lnPM;t   ln ¯ PM;t
)
. (10)
Assume that imports, aggregate demand, and import prices are growing at constant rates along the




βk;t ln ¯ Dk;t
)
+βP∆ln ¯ PM;t is a constant, which we denote
δ, and we can rewrite equation (10) as:
∆lnMt  δ +
∑
k
∆(βk;t lnDk;t) + βP∆lnPM;t.
To a ﬁrst order, we reduced import growth to an increasing function of aggregate demand growth
and a decreasing function of growth in import prices.
Next, assume that there exists a βD > 0 such that βk;t = βDωk;t. Then,
∆lnMt  δ + βD
∑
k
∆(ωk;t lnDk;t) + βP∆lnPM;t.










∆lnMt  δ + βD∆lnIADt + βP∆lnPM;t. (11)
This—or, more precisely, its stochastic version—is the benchmark regression equation of the same
form as (3), with IAD as the correct measure of aggregate demand, and with unrestricted aggregate
demand elasticity βD.26
In principle, one could econometrically estimate the individual coeﬃcients βk;t by estimating
∆lnMt = δ +
∑
k
∆(βk;t lnDk;t) + βP∆lnPM;t + εt,
where εt is the error term, at the cost of degrees of freedom. Our approach is to impose the coeﬃcients
ωk;t from the Input-Output tables (subject to the normalization
∑
k ωk;t = 1) and use the constructed
aggregate variable IADt in the stochastic version of (11), identifying the common constant coeﬃcient
βD.
25Note that the regression equations based on C.E.S. demand also abstract from a direct eﬀect of changes in factor
endowments.
26As Feenstra (2003a, Ch. 3) notes, the approach we followed—treating exports and imports as an output and input,
respectively, in the production process, and deﬁning exports and imports independently from consumption—is sensible
if exports are diﬀerentiated from domestic goods and imports are mainly intermediates. Both are empirically plausible
assumptions.
174.2 Translog Import Function
An alternative to the approach above would be to assume instead that the import function M =
 VPM(D,PM,F) is directly described by the translog function:
lnM = α +
∑
k





























ϕkf lnDk lnFf + lnPM
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where βP < 0.27
In this case, the IAD-based regression equation essentially follows from ﬁrst-diﬀerencing (12)
under the assumption that second-order terms and factor endowments are constant over time. In-




∆(βk;t lnDk;t) + βP∆lnPM.
Assuming next that βk;t = βDωk;t and proceeding as in the case of the translog GDP function, we
obtain:
∆lnMt = βD∆lnIADt + βP∆lnPM;t. (13)
Except for the constant included in the regression and the error term, this is again the benchmark
regression equation with IAD as the correct measure of aggregate demand in import determination.
The advantage of this approach to obtaining the regression equation is that it does not rely
on the approximations used with the translog GDP function and, therefore, it is not restricted
to small perturbations around the steady-state path (which certainly do not describe the 2008-09
collapse). On the other hand, the assumption of a translog GDP function is more conventional in the
literature. Importantly, though, both approaches provide a justiﬁcation for the same import demand
and regression equation. As we shall show below, using IAD in this standard regression equation
outperforms the traditional alternatives.
5 Empirical Analysis
The objective of this section is to test empirically the ability of the new import intensity-adjusted
measure of demand to explain the dynamics of import ﬂows. To this aim, we ﬁrst investigate
the overall performance of regressions of the form (11) against other speciﬁcations using standard
measures of aggregate demand. We then explicitly look at the Great Trade Collapse episode of 2008-
09 to understand whether the fall in world trade during the GTC is still largely unexplained once
27We again omit parameter restrictions we do not rely on below.
18the import intensity of aggregate demand components is taken into account (which would call for
other factors as primary explanations of the GTC). Finally, we assess the performance of our new
measure of aggregate demand at tracking import ﬂows over diﬀerent phases of the business cycle,
comparing it with the performance of the standard GDP speciﬁcation, with an eye to addressing the
broader Houthakker-Magee puzzle.
Results build on a dataset of 18 OECD countries, repeated here for the reader’s convenience:
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway,
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The data on imports and exports of goods and services, GDP, private and government consumption,
investment, all in volume, and the series of import prices come from the OECD Economic Outlook
database.28 The time series are at quarterly frequency, and the estimation is performed over the
period 1985Q1-2010Q2. We construct relative import prices by dividing the series of import prices
of goods and services for each country by the respective GDP deﬂator.
5.1 Panel Estimation Results
We start by estimating a simple, standard equation for imports. In the regression, motivated by the-
ory, the quarterly growth of real imports for each country c, ∆lnMc;t, depends on contemporaneous
values of the quarterly growth of aggregate demand, ∆lnDc;t, and the quarterly growth of relative
import prices, ∆lnPM;c;t, as well as country dummies δc:
∆lnMc;t = δc + βD∆lnDc;t + βP∆lnPM;c;t + εc;t (14)
In the analysis that follows, we compare three measures of aggregate demand: Two are standard
measures, where either GDP or domestic demand, DD (computed as the sum of private and gov-
ernment consumption and investment), are used as measures of D, and the third is the new import
intensity-adjusted measure of demand, IAD. We also consider an alternative speciﬁcation of the
equation, where import growth is a function also of its own lags and lags of the explanatory variables
to allow for richer dynamics:29









βM;l∆lnMc;t l + εc;t (15)
We estimate panel regressions of the type (14) and (15) using country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and
robust variance-covariance matrix estimates.30 Table 3 presents the in-sample results of the 6 speci-
28We use time series on gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF) to proxy for investment in the empirical exercise. This
is consistent with the fact that we use the import content of GFCF computed from the OECD I-O tables to construct
IAD. Although we are aware that investment does not coincide with GFCF, we will use the term investment instead
of GFCF in the rest of the paper.
29We considered L = 1 in our preferred speciﬁcation.
30As a robustness check we also performed the same regressions using ﬁxed weights (at the 2005 values) instead of
time-varying weights in constructing IAD to assess the extent to which using changing weights aﬀects our results. The
19ﬁcations just described for the full set of 18 countries and the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the UK, and the U.S.) for the entire sample period. Estimation results show that the regres-
sion using IAD is noticeably superior to those using GDP or DD in terms of ﬁt, and this applies
both to the full set of countries and the sub-set of G7 countries. Including lags of the dependent
and independent variables improves the ﬁt marginally and does not reveal substantial changes in the
elasticity point estimates, especially when using IAD as demand variable. The ranking of the three
measures of D also remains unchanged.31
Figure 7 shows actual and ﬁtted values of real import growth for a subsample of countries32,
where the ﬁtted values are obtained by estimating the panel regression (15) using respectively IAD,
GDP,and DD as demand variables. The superiority of IAD in tracking import growth against the
alternatives stands out clearly from the ﬁgure, especially in periods of large falls in imports, such as
the Great Trade Collapse of 2008-09.
5.2 The Composition of Demand and the Great Trade Collapse
Figures 8 illustrates exactly how much of the fall in imports observed during 2008Q4 and 2009Q1
the three aggregate demand speciﬁcations are able to account for on average and for each individual
country (panel A and B refer to the panel regression (15) for all 18 countries, whereas panel C and D
to the same regression performed for the G7 only): The blue bar in the “Total” part of each diagram
shows the actual fall in aggregate imports in the 18 countries33 together with the predicted aggregate
fall using IAD (black bars), GDP (red bars), and DD (green bars), respectively. In particular, the
weighted average of real imports in our sample of countries fell by 5.6% in 2008Q4 and 9.3% in
2009Q1, on a quarterly basis. Using IAD as explanatory variable captures 67% and 63% of the fall
in aggregate imports in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, respectively, while only 41% and 29% is explained by
the GDP-based speciﬁcation. Results for the G7 are even more striking: On average, using IAD
explains 94% and 85% of the average fall in imports in the G7, against 61% and 51% when GDP is
used. In panel C and D, an additional (orange) bar is included for each country, corresponding to the
predictions of the IAD speciﬁcation controlling also for changes in inventories.34 As shown by the
results of this exercise, which we do not show here for brevity, show very little change in the coeﬃcient estimates and
in sample ﬁt of the IAD speciﬁcation. (Details are available upon request.) This shows that the superiority of IAD
that we document below relies on the ability of our new measure of demand to capture the dynamics of the diﬀerent
demand components and not on the time-variation of the aggregating weights.
31Notice that, in all speciﬁcations, we add two dummy variables to capture two episodes of erratic movements in
trade in the UK in 2006Q1 and 2006Q3. Concerning these quarters the UK Oﬃce for National Statistics said: “Erratic
and large movements in the level of trade associated with VAT Missing Trader Intra Community (MTIC) fraud have
made it especially diﬃcult to interpret movements in imports and exports of goods.” The inclusion of such dummies
does not change the essence of the results.
32The U.S., the UK, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Spain. We do not report the results for the other
countries to save space, but they are available upon request.
33To construct the aggregate values of import growth, we used the respective average import shares of the countries
between 2000 and 2009.
34In particular, we estimate equation (15) using IAD as demand variable and adding as a control variable the changes
in inventories as a percentage of GDP. For this exercise we used the time series of “change in stocks” and GDP at
current prices from the OECD Main Economic Indicator Database. The lack of long spans of data for some countries
20orange bars, including changes in inventories helps improve the ﬁt of the model: On average, using
IAD and controlling for changes in inventories explains 99% and 93% of the average fall in imports
in the G7 in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, respectively.
The speciﬁcation using IAD allows us to go one step further in investigating the relation between
the composition of demand and the GTC. Using the estimated coeﬃcients from regression (15), we
can decompose import growth for each country in the panel and compute the individual contribution
of the four IAD components (C, I, X, and G), as well as PM, in explaining import ﬂuctuations.
This allows us to disentangle, for instance, the relative importance of each demand component in
driving the fall in imports during the GTC.
Table 4 shows such a decomposition for 2009Q1, which corresponds to the trough in trade series
during the recent global crisis. The second column in the table reports quarterly import growth
in 2009Q1 for the 18 countries in the panel; Columns 3 to 8 report the percentage of the fall in
imports explained by the explanatory variables IAD and PM in equation (15) and by each demand
component in IAD (notice that the sum of the contributions of C, I, X, and G is equal to the
contribution of IAD). The last column shows the percentage of the fall in imports explained by
GDP from the regression using GDP as demand measure.
Several results are worth noting: First, the percentage of import growth explained by IAD
alone is in general very high, sometimes close to 100%, and, in most of the cases, much higher
than the percentage explained by GDP alone (in the cases of Germany and Sweden, however, both
speciﬁcations produce a larger-than-observed fall in imports, with the speciﬁcation using GDP doing
slightly better than the IAD one). Second, the contribution of PM is negative for most of the
countries, meaning that relative import prices generally decreased in 2009Q1, hence, contributing an
increase rather than a decrease in imports over the same quarter (remember that the coeﬃcient of
PM in Table 3 is negative).
Finally, looking at the individual demand components, two main facts emerge: First, private
and government consumption growth contribute only marginally to explaining the fall in imports in
2009Q1, the former explaining at most about 10% of it in a few countries, such as Denmark, the
UK, and the Netherlands, and the latter explaining an even lower percentage (and often implying an
increase rather than a decrease in imports as a result of the fact that government consumption was
increasing in most of the countries following the implementation of counter-cyclical ﬁscal policies).
Second, while investment and exports indeed explain most of the fall in imports, the main driver of
the fall varies substantially across countries, making it possible to identify countries that experienced
an “export-driven” or an “investment-driven” import collapse. The U.S., Norway, Sweden, and New
Zealand are among the countries that experienced an “investment-driven” import collapse, although
the percentage of the import fall explained by exports is also high for some of them. Japan, France,
in our sample makes it impossible to perform the same exercise for the entire panel of 18 countries. The results of this
exercise are not shown here for brevity, but they are available upon request.
21Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, and Korea instead experienced an “export-driven” import
collapse. Finally, in some countries, such as the UK, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands, both
components of demand played roles of more similar magnitude in explaining the fall in imports.35
To summarize, according to our investigation, there is no major “puzzle” in the magnitude of
the fall in world trade observed during the recent ﬁnancial crisis: Trade fell mostly because demand
crashed globally and did so particularly in its most import-intensive component—investment. More-
over, the strong relationship between exports and imports in each country, linked to the increased
internationalization of production and the strong dependence of the tradable sector on imported in-
puts, contributed to the simultaneity and unprecedented severity of the trade collapse. Our approach
and results conﬁrm Marquez’s (1999) argument that using standard measures of aggregate demand,
such as GDP or domestic demand, in trade equations may be misleading, and more so in periods
in which the more import-intensive components of aggregate demand (i.e., investment and exports)
ﬂuctuate much more than the others, such as the 2008-09 crisis.
5.3 Trade Elasticities over the Business Cycle: Toward a Solution to the Houthakker-
Magee Puzzle
Since the speciﬁcation using IAD performs well in explaining the 2008-09 Great Trade Collapse, it
is important to understand whether the superiority of IAD against standard alternatives shown in
Table 3 comes from a better ﬁt only during recession periods, when highly import-intensive demand
components tend to fall on average more than the components that are relatively less import-intensive
(as shown in Figure 6), or survives also when those periods are taken out of the sample. This is a
relevant question, since only in the second case we would be able to conclude that the new measure
of demand is in fact superior to standard measures and should be preferred in empirical work aimed
at estimating trade elasticities. Moreover, since not all recessions are crises and not all crises are
global, such as the 2008-09 one, we perform two alternative estimations for the recession periods,
one in which we exclude the recent global crisis and one where we include it.
This exercise also allows us to look more carefully at the values of the elasticity of imports to
aggregate demand over the business cycle, with an eye to addressing the well-known Houthakker-
Magee puzzle. In Section 4, we have provided a theoretical foundation for a (log) import demand
equation that is consistent with the traditional regression equation (14) (which, in turn, is the
foundation for regression (15) in the empirical literature), and does not restrict the elasticity of
imports to aggregate demand to be one. However, as discussed above, a demand system that does
not restrict the coeﬃcient of aggregate demand in the import equation to one does not in itself imply
resolution of the economic puzzle that a coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly above one can derail sustainability.36
35Results for 2008Q4, which we do not show here to save space, are broadly similar and provide the same country
classiﬁcation.
36This represents a puzzle because it implies that, to prevent the trade balance from permanently moving into
deﬁcit, the real exchange rate should permanently depreciate over time (this is also under the condition that foreign
22Table 5 shows the result of the regressions (14) and (15) estimated separately for three diﬀerent
data samples, one looking only at recessions and excluding the 2008-09 crisis, labeled as “recessions”
in the table, one looking at all recessions including the 2008-09 crisis, labeled as “GTC”, and one
looking only at “expansion” periods.37 We compare here the results from the equation using our
new import intensity-adjusted measure of demand and the speciﬁcation using GDP, this latter being
in general the preferred measure in the literature estimating import elasticities. In the bottom panel
of Table 5, which shows results from regression equation (15), we report directly the sum of the
coeﬃcients on contemporaneous and lagged aggregate demand to facilitate the comparison between
the two speciﬁcations. Several results are worth mentioning. First, both speciﬁcations do better at
estimating real import growth during recession times, i.e., in periods when the fall in demand is
particularly crucial to explain the behavior of trade. Second, the regression using IAD outperforms
the GDP one during both phases of the cycle in terms of goodness of ﬁt—the improvement from
using IAD being even larger in the expansionary phases of the cycle. This shows that the results in
Table 3 are not driven only by extreme events, but they apply to the entire estimation period. Third,
the elasticity of imports to aggregate demand generally varies between recessions and expansions,
with some important distinctions to be made.
Starting with the results of “recessions” and “expansions” only (hence, excluding the GTC
episode): The import elasticity to GDP doubles during recessions and is close to 3 when one lag of
the exogenous variables is included in the regression. Instead, when IAD is used as aggregate de-
mand measure, the elasticity of imports to aggregate demand is remarkably stable across expansions
and recessions. It is exactly equal to one in the regression without lags and close to 1.5 when one
lag of IAD is added.38 These ﬁndings corroborate the idea that using GDP as demand measure
in trade equations may be misleading as it delivers highly volatile estimates of demand elasticities
that may indicate the presence of structural breaks even when this is not the case. Moreover, these
results suggest that the Houthakker-Magee puzzle, which is generally found in estimation of import
equations using GDP as measure of aggregate demand, may be driven by the inclusion of few but
highly volatile observations in the estimation sample, i.e., by the inclusion of recession episodes.39
Our new measure of demand, instead, by taking into account the diﬀerent import contents of demand
components, delivers elasticities that are lower in magnitude and more stable over the cycle, making
a signiﬁcant step toward the solution of the Houthakker-Magee puzzle.40
and domestic output grow at similar rates). Another puzzling implication of having a demand elasticity above one is
that output should be completely imported in the long run, barring a permanent depreciating trend.
37As in the previous section, recessions are deﬁned as two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth. We
present results for the full set of countries. Results for the G7 are very similar and are available upon request.
38As a corollary, the IAD speciﬁcation also provides higher (in absolute value) and more signiﬁcant estimates for
the elasticities to import prices, which is a promising result as few papers ﬁnd a large and signiﬁcant role for relative
prices in trade equations.
39In their 1969 article, Houthakker and Magee use GNP at constant prices to compute import elasticities. Other
studies have used either GNP or GDP to estimate the elasticity of imports to aggregate demand for the U.S. and other
advanced economies (e.g., see Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez, 2000, and the literature reviewed therein).
40The empirical literature estimating import elasticities generally distinguishes between short-run and long-run elas-
23Turning to the recession sample this time including the 2008-09 crisis, we observe an even stronger
increase of the elasticity of imports to GDP compared to expansionary phases—the contemporaneous
elasticity increases by a factor of 4 against a twofold increase when the GTC is excluded. In the case
of IAD, we also observe an increase of the import elasticity, although much lower than in the GDP
case, and a substantial increase of the in-sample ﬁt. The increase in the elasticity estimates in both
speciﬁcations suggests that the 2008-09 global crisis was indeed an exceptional event. In particular,
results in Table 5 suggest that nonlinearities in the relation between imports and aggregate demand
still persist when IAD is used as measure of aggregate demand. This may be due to the role of other
factors not accounted for in our simple model of imports, such as ﬁnancial constraints, the analysis
of which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, our simple model is enough to explain most
of the GTC episode, as shown in Section 5.2, and to reduce dramatically the elasticity diﬀerence
between diﬀerent phases of the cycle.
To summarize, although a direct comparison with other models is not possible, the results using
IAD as demand variable go in the same direction of other papers that found lower import elastic-
ities to measures of aggregate demand once import equations are corrected for other factors, such
as vertical integration or aggregation bias. Cardarelli and Rebucci (2007), for instance, ﬁnd that
once exports of intermediate products are added in the U.S. import equation to account for vertical
integration, the resulting GDP elasticity of imports drops signiﬁcantly and becomes lower than one.
A similar result holds in Bussi` ere, Chudik, and Sestieri (2009) in the context of a global VAR where
exports enter in the import cointegration relation. Our approach is in principle more complete, as
we do not correct only for vertical integration, but also for the import content of diﬀerent demand
components that is not taken into account when using GDP. Moreover, this approach has the advan-
tage of using a single statistic, the import intensity-adjusted measure of demand, delivering a single
demand coeﬃcient of easier interpretation.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposed a new methodology for the estimation of trade elasticities, based on an import
intensity-adjusted measure of aggregate demand. While standard empirical trade models typically
use GDP (or domestic demand) as measure of aggregate demand, we argue that there is value added
in giving diﬀerent weights to the components of GDP, which typically have very diﬀerent import
intensities. In particular, the analysis of the new OECD Input-Output tables shows that, in general,
investment is signiﬁcantly more import intensive than private consumption, which in turn is more
import intensive than government spending. In addition, we also ﬁnd that exports are very import
intensive.
ticities, the latter generally preferred in debates on the sustainability of the current account to which the Houthakker-
Magee puzzle is related. Here, we compute and discuss only short-run elasticities, the correct model speciﬁcation to
estimate long-run elasticities being beyond the scope of this paper.
24Carefully disentangling the eﬀects of investment, private and government consumption, and ex-
ports turns out to improve the goodness of ﬁt of the model signiﬁcantly, and it is especially important
in the context of the 2008-09 crisis, during which these diﬀerent components of aggregate demand
evolved very diﬀerently. In particular, investment and exports decreased most signiﬁcantly over this
period, whereas government spending remained robust, supported largely by the ﬁscal packages put
in place by governments in response to the crisis. Recognizing that investment and exports are more
import intensive than private and government consumption helps explain why regressions using stan-
dard measures of aggregate demand that do not account for diﬀerences in import intensity typically
underestimate the fall in trade that took place in 2008-09. Moreover, the high import intensity of ex-
ports contributes to explaining the synchronicity of the trade collapse across countries. We reported
key stylized facts on these developments, put also in historical perspective, and provided a theoret-
ical foundation and econometric evidence in support of our novel measure of demand. We showed
that using the import intensity-adjusted measure of demand proposed in this paper can signiﬁcantly
enhance the performance of empirical trade models, helping resolve new and long-standing questions
in international economics.
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29Figure 3: OECD Input-Output tables of Total, Domestic and Import transactions
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30Figure 4: Import contents of main GDP components
Source: OECD OECD Input-Output Tables and authors￿calculations.
Figure 5: Short-term correlations between imports and main GDP components
































































































































































































































































32Figure 7: Actual vs. ￿tted values of real import growth - Selected economies




Notes: The solid line shows actual import growth, the dotted black line shows ￿tted values from the regression
using  as a measure of demand, the dotted red line from the  speci￿cation and the dotted green line from






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 1.a: Total import content of main GDP components
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Australia 17,0% 18,6% 18,4% 9,0% 10,0% 9,9% 26,5% 26,6% 26,0% 14,0% 14,1% 14,0%
Austria 24,2% 28,4% 28,7% 9,3% 11,0% 11,5% 36,7% 42,3% 42,7% 30,0% 34,6% 34,7%
Belgium 32,3% 36,5% 33,6% 7,7% 10,6% 12,4% 43,6% 52,6% 49,7% 40,9% 45,9% 43,2%
Canada 25,9% 23,7% 25,8% 10,3% 10,0% 9,8% 39,0% 42,1% 34,8% 30,5% 30,9% 27,4%
Czech Republic 34,0% 39,5% 38,6% 18,8% 20,3% 19,8% 39,2% 53,3% 52,1% 29,1% 45,6% 48,3%
Denmark 21,4% 30,3% 31,8% 7,1% 8,9% 10,4% 34,3% 40,3% 39,1% 27,1% 32,3% 34,9%
Finland 20,6% 22,9% 26,8% 7,9% 10,8% 12,0% 42,4% 34,5% 32,4% 28,8% 33,4% 38,0%
France 19,4% 22,0% 22,7% 8,2% 8,0% 8,7% 24,7% 27,2% 25,4% 19,8% 26,5% 27,0%
Germany 18,3% 22,1% 22,6% 6,3% 8,0% 8,6% 22,7% 30,5% 31,1% 20,4% 25,8% 27,2%
Greece 21,0% 24,4% 24,1% 11,6% 19,4% 9,9% 35,0% 36,5% 35,5% 15,8% 26,9% 25,9%
Hungary 47,1% 35,4% 35,6% 29,2% 16,5% 15,4% 60,0% 53,6% 49,1% 47,4% 58,6% 55,8%
Iceland 30,7% 16,9% 14,8% 17,4% 6,2% 5,5% 41,7% 24,1% 24,4% 26,7% 26,9% 27,1%
Ireland 46,3% 42,0% 37,2% 16,4% 13,8% 14,4% 51,5% 48,6% 41,5% 48,7% 53,3% 50,7%
Italy 18,2% 20,7% 21,3% 5,7% 6,7% 7,2% 25,7% 29,6% 27,3% 23,4% 27,1% 29,0%
Japan 9,1% 9,8% 11,7% 3,0% 2,8% 6,0% 8,2% 10,6% 15,3% 8,4% 9,6% 15,4%
Korea 21,4% 23,8% 24,2% 11,4% 10,2% 10,5% 30,8% 35,5% 28,9% 29,9% 38,1% 38,6%
Luxembourg 45,5% 51,8% 50,3% 15,7% 18,1% 18,4% 49,9% 54,7% 53,6% 41,3% 57,7% 60,4%
Mexico 31,4% 18,6% 17,2% 8,3% 5,0% 4,7% 42,6% 32,0% 30,2% 42,5% 39,3% 33,2%
Netherlands 26,2% 28,5% 30,3% 10,4% 11,2% 11,3% 41,6% 41,6% 39,3% 33,3% 36,9% 34,9%
New Zealand 21,1% 23,8% 21,4% 10,1% 11,6% 9,8% 37,9% 41,2% 39,3% 18,1% 19,2% 17,5%
Norway 29,1% 31,8% 32,0% 11,1% 10,9% 10,9% 42,1% 42,0% 36,4% 21,6% 16,9% 16,2%
Poland 19,7% 26,3% 24,9% 8,0% 6,4% 9,5% 30,0% 45,8% 47,9% 16,8% 24,7% 30,6%
Portugal 27,5% 32,5% 29,0% 8,7% 10,9% 9,5% 35,3% 38,3% 36,1% 35,8% 30,8% 38,9%
Slovak Republic 38,2% 43,1% 44,7% 17,7% 16,3% 21,6% 53,6% 52,2% 57,3% 35,4% 50,3% 48,6%
Spain 18,1% 23,1% 24,0% 7,3% 9,9% 11,3% 26,1% 34,6% 28,3% 26,6% 33,9% 34,2%
Sweden 23,2% 26,4% 28,1% 10,5% 11,3% 11,2% 43,7% 47,8% 43,0% 28,9% 32,3% 33,2%
Switzerland 16,3% 22,5% 24,4% 5,8% 9,2% 9,3% 26,6% 33,1% 33,9% 14,2% 23,1% 25,3%
Turkey 18,1% 15,8% 23,0% 6,0% 10,3% 14,6% 36,8% 33,7% 41,7% 13,9% 13,6% 30,7%
United Kingdom 21,1% 24,9% 27,2% 11,2% 12,7% 12,5% 37,4% 35,0% 25,4% 22,2% 20,3% 18,6%
United States 8,7% 10,5% 11,9% 3,7% 6,0% 6,2% 18,4% 19,1% 17,3% 9,5% 11,0% 12,3%
Argentina 8,2% 7,9% 12,4% 2,2% 1,8% 2,8% 22,6% 22,6% 27,1% 10,3% 10,9% 16,8%
Brazil 9,6% 12,2% 10,4% 3,3% 4,8% 3,7% 13,1% 14,6% 20,9% 10,8% 12,0% 14,4%
China 11,4% 13,4% 19,1% 9,9% 10,8% 13,8% 26,2% 20,8% 28,8% 15,5% 19,6% 27,4%
Chinese Taipei 24,4% 22,9% 26,3% 13,6% 9,3% 8,7% 42,0% 49,9% 50,6% 35,2% 37,3% 48,3%
India 7,6% 10,4% 14,0% 5,9% 8,1% 8,3% 21,6% 23,7% 28,7% 10,4% 12,4% 18,5%
Indonesia 16,9% 23,3% 22,4% 12,4% 14,0% 13,9% 30,6% 35,5% 30,4% 15,1% 19,5% 18,1%
Israel 20,1% 30,2% 29,6% 6,2% 14,9% 15,5% 21,4% 38,3% 39,5% 16,6% 34,1% 37,9%
Russian Fed. 22,8% 24,7% 23,2% 10,6% 12,1% 12,2% 20,0% 25,7% 26,0% 10,6% 10,9% 9,1%
Singapore 45,9% 43,0% 46,7% 27,6% 35,0% 35,4% 58,2% 59,0% 64,0% 57,2% 58,4% 56,6%
South Africa 14,3% 18,4% 20,6% 5,5% 7,1% 8,7% 29,5% 37,4% 34,5% 9,7% 15,2% 14,6%
Hong Kong 12,0% 9,5% 7,0% 8,4% 9,7% 6,3% 14,0% 10,2% 5,9% 13,9% 14,1% 12,6%
Chile 23,4% 27,8% 31,7% 8,5% 8,2% 9,8% 39,4% 35,2% 37,6% 19,0% 19,0% 23,2%
Estonia 49,8% 40,0% 41,3% 25,1% 19,1% 18,5% 69,2% 58,8% 55,5% 47,5% 55,1% 50,8%
Slovenia 39,0% 36,2% 37,6% 19,6% 16,3% 15,7% 54,2% 54,7% 50,6% 36,9% 43,6% 45,6%
Malaysia 46,7% 41,8% 42,3% 24,4% 24,4% 25,2% 55,9% 64,1% 62,3% 38,8% 53,0% 50,4%
Philippines 25,1% 28,5% 32,1% 12,0% 11,8% 8,3% 41,2% 52,3% 53,1% 32,4% 46,0% 41,6%
Thailand 28,9% 31,7% 26,9% 8,2% 9,7% 10,5% 42,3% 52,5% 61,8% 33,5% 40,6% 38,1%
Romania 22,4% 24,1% 26,9% 19,0% 20,8% 17,8% 35,8% 47,9% 51,7% 26,0% 27,9% 29,0%
Vietnam 16,3% 33,3% 36,9% 12,2% 26,3% 28,8% 40,5% 50,6% 54,3% 15,0% 27,5% 30,6%
Saudi Arabia 17,4% 30,5% 34,8% 12,7% 18,8% 14,2% 19,6% 48,4% 52,6% 1,3% 5,9% 2,0%
Import content of exports
.
Import content of private
consumption
Import content of government
consumption
Import content of total
investment
Source: OECD Input-Output Tables and authors￿calculations.
35Table 1.b: Induced import content of main GDP components
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Australia 9,1% 9,1% 8,8% 9,0% 8,9% 8,7% 11,1% 11,1% 11,1%
Austria 11,0% 13,3% 13,8% 7,8% 9,1% 9,2% 16,2% 16,0% 18,1%
Belgium 17,4% 19,5% 18,9% 7,3% 9,5% 11,2% 21,6% 23,8% 21,0%
Canada 11,3% 10,6% 9,4% 10,3% 10,0% 9,8% 16,1% 15,3% 15,6%
Czech Republic 19,1% 20,6% 20,5% 14,2% 17,6% 14,4% 21,0% 23,9% 20,9%
Denmark 9,9% 11,7% 13,3% 6,4% 8,1% 9,3% 15,3% 17,5% 19,0%
Finland 10,7% 12,7% 13,3% 7,1% 9,8% 10,8% 12,3% 18,4% 18,4%
France 9,3% 11,0% 10,7% 6,5% 6,8% 6,8% 12,1% 13,5% 13,0%
Germany 9,0% 11,7% 12,0% 5,5% 7,0% 7,1% 11,7% 14,5% 15,4%
Greece 8,8% 11,3% 10,0% 10,6% 18,1% 10,2% 17,0% 14,0% 13,8%
Hungary 25,6% 23,7% 18,5% 19,5% 13,5% 11,4% 22,3% 20,8% 20,7%
Iceland 14,8% 9,2% 8,0% 13,7% 6,2% 5,5% 13,2% 5,4% 5,7%
Ireland 16,3% 16,1% 19,6% 13,1% 13,8% 14,4% 23,0% 21,7% 22,8%
Italy 11,8% 13,2% 13,1% 5,4% 6,2% 6,6% 14,7% 15,6% 14,8%
Japan 4,6% 5,1% 6,9% 3,0% 2,8% 6,0% 5,6% 6,4% 9,1%
Korea 14,8% 16,6% 16,0% 11,4% 10,2% 10,5% 15,4% 17,8% 17,8%
Luxembourg 15,4% 18,8% 22,1% 13,0% 15,8% 16,7% 19,3% 22,1% 30,8%
Mexico 18,0% 11,7% 11,2% 8,3% 5,0% 4,6% 26,8% 16,2% 14,4%
Netherlands 13,8% 14,5% 15,8% 9,2% 10,0% 10,3% 19,7% 19,0% 16,3%
New Zealand 11,5% 12,6% 11,0% 8,8% 10,4% 8,9% 14,4% 15,3% 13,5%
Norway 13,2% 12,8% 11,9% 10,0% 9,5% 9,3% 15,0% 14,2% 14,1%
Poland 12,2% 14,3% 14,8% 6,9% 6,0% 7,8% 15,0% 14,3% 15,9%
Portugal 14,6% 15,2% 14,7% 7,7% 8,3% 7,9% 16,0% 16,4% 17,0%
Slovak Republic 18,8% 20,7% 17,5% 17,7% 16,3% 12,7% 18,7% 21,9% 18,2%
Spain 10,7% 12,8% 12,2% 6,7% 8,8% 9,0% 12,7% 15,6% 14,0%
Sweden 12,6% 14,1% 14,7% 9,5% 10,0% 9,6% 15,7% 15,9% 17,2%
Switzerland 8,3% 11,0% 13,2% 5,8% 9,1% 9,2% 11,0% 17,5% 18,3%
Turkey 9,6% 11,6% 14,5% 6,0% 6,8% 10,7% 11,0% 13,0% 21,0%
United Kingdom 11,7% 10,4% 10,5% 11,2% 12,3% 12,5% 12,2% 11,7% 11,4%
United States 4,1% 4,6% 5,8% 3,7% 4,5% 6,2% 7,8% 7,8% 9,0%
Argentina 4,9% 4,5% 6,3% 2,2% 1,8% 2,8% 7,1% 7,1% 11,6%
Brazil 5,7% 7,2% 7,1% 3,3% 4,8% 3,7% 5,9% 7,7% 11,0%
China 9,6% 10,3% 14,0% 9,5% 10,6% 13,6% 11,5% 15,4% 20,5%
Chinese Taipei 12,9% 11,9% 15,4% 13,6% 9,3% 8,7% 18,9% 18,4% 21,0%
India 5,5% 6,4% 11,4% 4,2% 4,4% 8,3% 12,1% 13,3% 19,9%
Indonesia 9,7% 11,2% 12,2% 9,8% 12,0% 12,1% 18,1% 21,8% 19,8%
Israel 9,1% 14,8% 15,0% 6,2% 14,9% 15,5% 11,3% 19,3% 20,6%
Russian Fed. 8,9% 9,5% 9,3% 9,9% 11,7% 11,7% 10,8% 13,2% 13,5%
Singapore 17,4% 18,7% 20,3% 27,6% 35,0% 35,4% 20,5% 23,3% 25,4%
South Africa 7,6% 10,4% 11,0% 5,5% 7,1% 8,7% 10,0% 13,4% 16,1%
Hong Kong 7,0% 5,7% 4,5% 8,4% 9,7% 6,3% 7,3% 4,9% 2,3%
Chile 12,9% 15,7% 17,3% 8,5% 8,2% 9,8% 12,0% 12,3% 14,7%
Estonia 23,3% 19,6% 18,7% 16,7% 17,3% 16,2% 19,1% 21,5% 20,6%
Slovenia 14,7% 14,3% 13,9% 16,1% 12,4% 11,6% 18,7% 18,3% 19,7%
Malaysia 20,8% 21,9% 23,3% 13,1% 22,2% 22,4% 20,0% 21,8% 19,9%
Philippines 14,6% 15,2% 15,6% 12,0% 11,8% 8,3% 17,1% 16,9% 17,6%
Thailand 15,3% 17,3% 21,8% 5,8% 9,7% 10,1% 19,9% 20,1% 25,3%
Romania 12,2% 15,7% 17,2% 18,0% 20,8% 17,8% 18,4% 15,4% 14,0%
Vietnam 12,3% 21,5% 23,9% 12,2% 26,3% 28,8% 27,6% 37,6% 41,4%
Saudi Arabia 3,7% 7,0% 8,3% 7,3% 11,9% 6,7% 2,4% 9,9% 11,9%
Import content of private
consumption
Import content of government
consumption
Import content of total
investment
Source: OECD Input-Output Tables and authors￿calculations.
36Table 1.c: Direct import content of main GDP components
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Australia 7,9% 9,5% 9,6% 0,0% 1,0% 1,2% 15,4% 15,5% 15%
Austria 13,2% 15,1% 14,9% 1,4% 1,9% 2,2% 20,5% 26,3% 25%
Belgium 14,8% 17,0% 14,8% 0,5% 1,1% 1,2% 22,0% 28,7% 29%
Canada 14,6% 13,2% 16,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 22,9% 26,8% 19%
Czech Republic 15,0% 19,0% 18,1% 4,6% 2,6% 5,4% 18,1% 29,4% 31%
Denmark 11,5% 18,6% 18,5% 0,7% 0,9% 1,1% 18,9% 22,9% 20%
Finland 9,9% 10,1% 13,6% 0,8% 1,0% 1,2% 30,1% 16,1% 14%
France 10,1% 11,0% 12,0% 1,7% 1,2% 1,9% 12,6% 13,7% 12%
Germany 9,3% 10,3% 10,5% 0,8% 1,0% 1,5% 11,0% 16,1% 16%
Greece 12,2% 13,1% 14,1% 1,0% 1,3% -0,3% 18,0% 22,4% 22%
Hungary 21,5% 11,7% 17,0% 9,7% 3,0% 4,1% 37,7% 32,8% 28%
Iceland 15,9% 7,7% 6,8% 3,7% 0,0% 0,0% 28,5% 18,7% 19%
Ireland 30,0% 25,9% 17,6% 3,3% 0,0% 0,0% 28,5% 26,9% 19%
Italy 6,4% 7,5% 8,1% 0,3% 0,5% 0,6% 11,0% 14,0% 13%
Japan 4,5% 4,7% 4,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,6% 4,3% 6%
Korea 6,6% 7,2% 8,2% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 15,4% 17,7% 11%
Luxembourg 30,1% 33,0% 28,1% 2,6% 2,2% 1,7% 30,6% 32,7% 23%
Mexico 13,4% 6,9% 6,0% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0% 15,8% 15,8% 16%
Netherlands 12,3% 14,1% 14,6% 1,2% 1,2% 0,9% 21,9% 22,7% 23%
New Zealand 9,6% 11,2% 10,4% 1,3% 1,2% 0,9% 23,6% 25,9% 26%
Norway 15,8% 19,1% 20,1% 1,1% 1,5% 1,6% 27,1% 27,8% 22%
Poland 7,5% 12,0% 10,1% 1,0% 0,4% 1,7% 15,0% 31,5% 32%
Portugal 13,0% 17,3% 14,4% 0,9% 2,6% 1,6% 19,3% 21,9% 19%
Slovak Republic 19,4% 22,4% 27,2% 0,0% 0,0% 8,9% 34,9% 30,3% 39%
Spain 7,4% 10,3% 11,8% 0,6% 1,1% 2,4% 13,5% 19,0% 14%
Sweden 10,6% 12,4% 13,5% 1,0% 1,3% 1,6% 28,0% 31,9% 26%
Switzerland 8,0% 11,5% 11,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 15,6% 15,6% 16%
Turkey 8,5% 4,2% 8,4% 0,0% 3,4% 3,9% 25,8% 20,7% 21%
United Kingdom 9,4% 14,5% 16,7% 0,0% 0,4% 0,0% 25,2% 23,4% 14%
United States 4,5% 6,0% 6,0% 0,0% 1,5% 0,0% 10,6% 11,4% 8%
Argentina 3,3% 3,4% 6,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 15,5% 15,5% 15%
Brazil 3,9% 5,1% 3,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 7,2% 6,9% 10%
China 1,8% 3,1% 5,1% 0,4% 0,2% 0,2% 14,7% 5,4% 8%
Chinese Taipei 11,5% 11,0% 10,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 23,1% 31,5% 30%
India 2,1% 4,0% 2,6% 1,7% 3,7% 0,0% 9,5% 10,4% 9%
Indonesia 7,3% 12,1% 10,2% 2,6% 2,0% 1,8% 12,4% 13,7% 11%
Israel 11,0% 15,4% 14,6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 10,1% 19,0% 19%
Russian Fed. 13,9% 15,2% 13,9% 0,7% 0,4% 0,4% 9,2% 12,5% 12%
Singapore 28,4% 24,3% 26,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 37,7% 35,8% 39%
South Africa 6,7% 8,0% 9,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 19,5% 24,1% 18%
Hong Kong 4,9% 3,8% 2,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 6,6% 5,3% 4%
Chile 10,5% 12,1% 14,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 27,4% 22,8% 23%
Estonia 26,4% 20,5% 22,6% 8,5% 1,9% 2,3% 50,1% 37,4% 35%
Slovenia 24,3% 21,9% 23,7% 3,5% 4,0% 4,1% 35,5% 36,3% 31%
Malaysia 25,9% 19,9% 19,0% 11,3% 2,2% 2,8% 35,9% 42,3% 42%
Philippines 10,5% 13,3% 16,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 24,0% 35,5% 35%
Thailand 13,5% 14,4% 5,1% 2,4% 0,0% 0,5% 22,4% 32,3% 36%
Romania 10,1% 8,5% 9,7% 0,9% 0,0% 0,0% 17,5% 32,5% 38%
Vietnam 4,0% 11,8% 13,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 12,9% 12,9% 13%
Saudi Arabia 13,7% 23,5% 26,5% 5,4% 6,9% 7,4% 17,2% 38,6% 41%
Import content of private
consumption
Import content of government
consumption
Import content of total
investment



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Table 3: Panel Results
The table reports in-sample estimates of panel regressions of the form (15) performed on our set of 18 countries
and on the G7 countries, respectively. The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate of real imports of goods
and services. Three models are compared in the table, according to the demand measure D used in each regression,
where IAD stands for our new import intensity-adjusted measure of demand, GDP for real GDP, and DD for
real domestic demand. PM are relative import prices. To save space we do not report here the point estimates of the
constant, and of the lagged values of the dependent variable and PM. R2 is the in-sample coeﬃcient of determination.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. , , and  indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The analysis uses quarterly data from 1985Q1 to 2010Q2.
All countries
IAD speciﬁcation GDP speciﬁcation DD speciﬁcation
0 lags 1 lag 0 lags 1 lag 0 lags 1 lag
∆ln(D)t 1.18*** 1.22*** 1.34*** 1.33*** 1.48*** 1.55***
(0.0978) (0.0711) (0.2872) (0.2423) (0.1393) (0.0827)
∆ln(D)t 1 0.50*** 0.88*** 0.58***
(0.0483) (0.1376) (0.1280)
∆ln(PM)t -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.14* -0.15** -0.05 -0.07
(0.05564) (0.0477) (0.0721) (0.0615) (0.0736) (0.0609)
R-sq 0.40 0.46 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.30
#Observations 1836 1836 1836 1836 1836 1836
G7
IAD speciﬁcation GDP speciﬁcation DD speciﬁcation
0 lags 1 lag 0 lags 1 lag 0 lags 1 lag
∆ln(D)t 1.35*** 1.26*** 1.60*** 1.27*** 1.62*** 1.50***
(0.1021) (0.0851) (0.1996) (0.1221) (0.2292) (0.1617)
∆ln(D)t 1 0.47*** 0.90*** 0.63***
(0.1096) (0.1884) (0.1509)
∆ln(PM)t -0.11** -0.14*** -0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.03
(0.0371) (0.0340) (0.0540) (0.0375) (0.0469) (0.0478)
R-sq 0.51 0.54 0.25 0.32 0.27 0.32
#Observations 714 714 714 714 714 714
39Table 4. Import Growth Decomposition - 2009Q1
The second column reports quarterly import growth in 2009Q1 for the 18 countries in our panel; Columns 3 to 8
report the percentage of import growth explained by the explanatory variables IAD and PM in equation (15) and
by each demand component in IAD (notice that the sum of the contributions of C, X, I and G is equal to the
contribution of IAD). The last column shows the percentage of import growth explained by GDP. Negative values
indicate that the explanatory variable account for import growth in the opposite direction of the one observed.
Percentage of import growth explained by :
Import Growth (%) IAD C X I G PM GDP
U.S.  10.9 80.6 1.4 31.4 47.7 0.2  13.0 30.0
UK  7.7 93.2 9.8 37.0 46.3 0.1 5.7 65.8
Japan  18.5 93.1 2.7 73.9 17.5  0.9  11.9 44.8
Germany  5.5 158.9  1.0 94.8 68.2  3.1  16.0 122.7
France  6.0 89.8  0.5 70.5 21.7  1.9  9.6 58.1
Italy  9.7 103.9 4.4 69.8 29.7 0.0  10.9 59.8
Canada  12.2 70.3 1.5 31.5 38.5  1.2  1.8 26.1
Australia  7.7 11.9  1.7  4.7 18.9  0.6  5.1  4.3
Spain  7.6 95.2 7.8 54.1 36.2  2.8  10.5 41.3
Netherlands  5.6 101.9 8.9 53.6 41.8  2.5  3.8 76.6
Porugal  11.4 90.5 6.0 51.5 35.1  2.1  5.0 32.1
Norway  16.2 27.3 3.0 3.4 23.4  2.5 4.0 4.4
NewZealand  7.5 57.1 4.5 2.0 51.9  1.3  10.6 20.6
Sweden  6.8 158.6 2.9 48.8 109.3  2.6  1.0 108.2
Belgium  6.7 86.6 3.7 61.1 21.7 0.1  16.5 63.1
Finland  13.1 97.3 3.5 69.5 25.3  1.0  11.2 82.4
Denmark  8.5 44.9 12.2 27.7 6.7  1.8  9.5 53.1
Korea  6.7 63.7 7.2 50.2 13.1  6.7  26.7 56.7
40T
a
b
l
e
5
:
R
e
c
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
v
s
.
E
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
s
T
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
p
a
n
e
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
∆
l
n
M
c
;
t
=
δ
c
+
β
D
∆
l
n
D
c
;
t
+
β
P
∆
l
n
P
M
;
c
;
t
+
ρ
c
;
t
+
ε
c
;
t
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
o
n
o
u
t
s
e
t
o
f
1
8
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
D
i
s
t
h
e
d
e
m
a
n
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
u
s
e
d
i
n
e
a
c
h
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
,
w
h
e
r
e
I
A
D
s
t
a
n
d
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
n
e
w
i
m
p
o
r
t
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
-
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
d
e
m
a
n
d
,
a
n
d
G
D
P
f
o
r
r
e
a
l
G
D
P
.
ρ
c
;
t
i
s
a
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
1
i
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
i
s
i
n
r
e
c
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
n
d
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
z
e
r
o
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
R
2
i
s
t
h
e
i
n
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
c
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
o
f
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
.
T
o
s
a
v
e
s
p
a
c
e
w
e
d
o
n
o
t
r
e
p
o
r
t
h
e
r
e
t
h
e
p
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
,
a
n
d
o
f
t
h
e
l
a
g
g
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
a
n
d
P
M
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.

,


,
a
n
d



i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
l
e
v
e
l
s
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
T
h
e
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
u
s
e
s
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
l
y
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
1
9
8
5
Q
1
t
o
2
0
1
0
Q
2
.
0
l
a
g
I
A
D
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
G
D
P
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
G
T
C
r
e
c
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
s
G
T
C
r
e
c
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
s
∆
l
n
(
D
)
t
1
.
6
6
*
*
*
1
.
0
0
*
*
*
0
.
9
7
*
*
*
2
.
8
5
*
*
*
1
.
4
8
*
*
*
0
.
7
0
*
*
(
0
.
2
0
3
4
)
(
0
.
3
6
4
8
)
(
0
.
0
9
2
1
)
(
0
.
3
0
5
2
)
(
0
.
4
1
4
2
)
(
0
.
2
7
5
7
)
∆
l
n
(
P
M
)
t
-
0
.
2
8
*
*
-
0
.
4
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
4
*
*
-
0
.
2
0
*
*
-
0
.
4
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
4
*
(
0
.
1
1
7
6
)
(
0
.
1
3
6
2
)
(
0
.
0
6
3
5
)
(
0
.
0
7
8
8
)
(
0
.
0
8
9
8
)
(
0
.
0
6
9
8
)
R
-
s
q
0
.
6
2
0
.
4
9
0
.
2
6
0
.
4
1
0
.
4
1
0
.
0
7
#
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
9
0
1
1
3
1
6
4
6
1
9
0
1
1
3
1
6
4
6
1
l
a
g
I
A
D
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
G
D
P
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
G
T
C
r
e
c
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
s
G
T
C
r
e
c
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
s
∑
∆
l
n
(
D
)
t
 
i
2
.
1
5
*
*
*
1
.
4
8
*
*
*
1
.
4
8
*
*
*
3
.
6
5
*
*
*
2
.
8
1
*
*
*
1
.
4
6
*
*
*
∆
l
n
(
P
M
)
t
-
0
.
3
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
8
*
*
-
0
.
1
4
*
*
-
0
.
2
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
2
*
(
0
.
1
0
5
8
)
(
0
.
1
6
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
5
7
1
)
(
0
.
0
6
9
7
)
(
0
.
1
1
6
5
)
(
0
.
0
6
3
6
)
R
-
s
q
0
.
6
7
0
.
5
5
0
.
3
3
0
.
4
9
0
.
5
2
0
.
1
2
#
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
9
0
1
1
3
1
6
4
6
1
9
0
1
1
3
1
6
4
6
41